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Abstract
Modus ponens provides the central theme. There are laws, of the form A → C. A logic
(or other theory) L collects such laws. Any datum A (or theory T incorporating such data)
provides input to the laws of L. The central ternary relation R relates theories L; T and U ,
where U consists of all of the outputs C got by applying modus ponens to major premises from
L and minor premises from T . Underlying this relation is a modus ponens product (or fusion)
operation ◦ on theories (or other collections of formulas) L and T , whence RLTU i, L◦T ⊆ U .
These ideas have been expressed, especially with Routley, as (Kripke style) worlds semantics
for relevant and other substructural logics.
Worlds are best demythologized as theories, subject to truth-functional and other constraints.
The chief constraint is that theories are taken as closed under logical entailment, which clearly
begs the question if we are using the semantics to determine which theory L is Logic itself.
Instead we draw the modal logicians’ conclusion—there are many substructural logics, each with
its appropriate ternary relational postulates.
Each logic L gives rise to a Calculus of L-theories, on which particular candidate logical
axioms have the combinatorial properties expected from the well-known Curry–Howard isomor-
phism (with improvements by Dezani and her fellow intersection type theorists.). We apply their
bubbling lemma, updating the Fools Model of Combinatory Logic at the pure → level for the
system B∧T. We make fusion ◦ an explicit connective, proving a combinator correspondence
theorem. Having taken relevant → as a left residual for ◦, we explore its right residual mate →r.
Finally we concentrate on and prove a ;nite model property for the classical minimal relevant
logic CB, a conservative extension of the minimal positive relevant logic B+.
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0. Introduction
Logic is the science of rational inference. Founded by Aristotle, it has through the
introduction of mathematical methods made remarkable progress in the past century
and a half. Polish logicians—headed by the great Alfred Tarski, to whose memory this
paper is dedicated—have played a leading role in this progress.
This paper surveys some ideas of mathematical beauty, which extend Tarski’s legacy.
These ideas have resulted from three decades of investigation of the semantics of
relevant and other substructural logics. Just as modal logics form a family, so also do
the relevant logics. Just as there is a minimal normal modal logic K, just so is there
a minimal classical relevant logic CB. Just as modal logics may be motivated via the
relational properties of a binary accessibility relation, so can relevant logics via the
properties of a ternary relation R. Of special interest is the correspondence between
candidate axioms for relevant logics and the combinators of Curry’s Combinatory Logic
CL and Church’s calculi  of 	-conversion.
This combinatorial Key to the Universe will be a main topic of this paper, whose
purpose (under the incisive prodding of a referee) will be chieIy expository. We shall
begin with a very brief survey of relevant logics—where they came from, and what are
the central points of their formal and philosophical motivation. A regard for relevance
will boil down to a careful look at the rule →E of modus ponens. That look will lead
us on to theories, collections of sentences that are closed under entailment (in the
appropriate sense).
1. Relevant logics
When does A imply C? The simple material answer, in practical vogue toward the
end of the last millennium, is that this happens i, either A is false or C is true. But
this answer is so deeply unsatisfying philosophically that almost nobody believes it.
(Belnap observes that Bertrand Russell might have, for a while.) At least, most would
concede, A must be in some sense honestly related to C for a genuine implication to
hold.
1.1. Church’s use criterion for relevant implication
A well-known proposal—essentially that of [7] for pure → logic—tracks this sense
of relevance. A→C holds (and we may say that A relevantly implies C) i, there exists
a deduction of C from A in which A is used. More generally (and associating → to
the right) A1→ · · · →An→C holds i, there is a deduction of C from A1; : : : ; An in
which all of the Ai are used.
This is the use criterion for separating the relevantly valid, pure → sheep from
irrelevant goats like the positive paradox p→ (q→p) of material implication. This
use criterion is discussed at some length in the standard treatise [2]. Supplied there
with a Fitch-style natural deduction system, it is taken to motivate exactly the weak
theory R→ of (pure relevant) implication of Church [7].
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Central to the application of the use criterion is that ‘use’ means, at the pure →
level, ‘use in an application of the rule →E of modus ponens for →’. Also stressed
is that it is su7cient for the relevant theoremhood of A1→ · · · →An→C that there
exist a deduction of C in which all the Ai are used.
There are some subtleties in how this use criterion may be varied to produce di,erent
systems of logic, even at the pure → level. See [20].
1.2. Adding extensional connectives to relevant →
The ;rst relevant logic to build in recognizable truth-functional connectives and
quanti;ers was the strenge Implikation of Ackermann [1], which we identify here
with the E (of entailment) of Anderson and Belnap [2] and the E∀∃x (of ;rst-order
entailment) of Anderson et al. [3]. These systems add ∧;∨ and ∼ at the propositional
level, intended as truth-functional ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘not’; roughly speaking, ∧ and ∨
are distributive lattice connectives, and duals relative to the (DeMorgan) negation ∼.
Similarly enriching R→ produces a full propositional logic R.
What, in the presence of these truth-functional connectives, becomes of the use
criterion? Its care and feeding become in practice more delicate. SuNce it to say here
that the composition of premisses under →E must be supplemented by attending to
their composition under the rule ∧ I of conjunction introduction. I shall not, at this
point, go into technical details, save to note that the result remains mathematically
coherent.
1.3. Bunching premisses relevantly
Well, I will go into a few technical details, about how premisses are bunched for
relevantly valid argument. We saw that, at the pure → level, it must be possible to use
all the hypotheses of an argument for the conclusion to have been derived relevantly.
There is a relevant connective that does this bunching, namely the fusion (or intensional
conjunction) connective ◦. Fusion stands to relevant → as extensional conjunction ∧
stands classically to material implication, for which we use ⊃ here. That is, we may
contrast
(1) A ◦B entails C i, A entails B→C (Relevant deduction theorem).
(2) A∧B entails C i, A entails B⊃C (Standard deduction theorem).
Put in a way to gladden algebraists’ hearts, → is the residual of ◦, as classical (or
intuitionist) ⊃ is the residual of ∧.
We have just seen that full relevant logics like E have both a relevant implication
→ and an extensional conjunction ∧. But where is their fusion ◦? One might ask the
same question of the relevant logic R. Through a happy syntactical accident, fusion is
in fact de:nable in R, which Dunn invoked in [11] to produce the class of DeMorgan
monoids. These are algebraic counterparts of R as Boolean algebras are counterparts of
classical propositional logic. It then turns out, applying semantic insights as in [24], that
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fusion (which is anyway wanted) belongs and may be incorporated in every relevant
logic.
We have, at this point, two formal analogues of and, an extensional ∧ and an
intensional ◦. This is the sort of thing that has led Lewis [18] to the complaint that
relevant logics are logics for equivocators. We answer that to make this complaint is to
misunderstand the utility of formal methods. Logicians model arguments in much the
same way as physicists devise and apply mathematical systems to model the World.
Our job, whether as logicians or physicists, is both to be faithful to the data of our
trade and to formulate the laws of that trade with as much care as our subject requires.
In Physics, this dual obligation leads on occasion to painful revision. Theories ac-
cepted everywhere bump into hard facts. Take some simple, satisfying law: we pick
pv= nRT (from high school physics), on which the volume of an ideal gas increases
with increasing temperature but decreases with increasing pressure. So it does, no
doubt, but the law states an exact mathematical relationship. The ;rst problem is that
real gases are not ideal. The problem bites because under special conditions—very low
temperatures, for one—this relationship becomes more and more inexact. And so the
nice and memorable Boyle’s law above gives way to (e.g.) van der Waals’ equation,
which is more complex but less inaccurate (until it too breaks down).
Something like this is what classical logic has done to us. Its simplicities bring
joy. (Everyone comes to comprehend truth tables.) But its oversimpli;cations bring
agony. (Many of the traditional problems in Philosophy of Science are pseudo-problems
induced by what was naively taken to be Our Logic.) If a false A may be taken
with Russell to imply everything, why has there been a problem of counterfactual
conditionals? And why will the student fail her history examination if she says that
the reason for the outbreak of World War I is that sugar is sweet? “I have given you,”
she may insist, “a true antecedent of what logicians say is a true conditional. If that
does not count as a reason, what does?”
But let us not dwell further on the straightforward contradiction by the data of a
favored theory. If Logic were Physics, van der Waals (to say nothing of Einstein and
Bohr) would long since have revised the theory to take better account of the data.
And this returns us to bunches, and to how premisses are put together for the sake of
argument. The extensional intuition, built into ordinary ∧, is that it suNces to use one
of the A’s in A1 ∧ · · · ∧An to have a valid argument. The relevant intuition, appropriate
to fusion ◦, is that there must be a way of using all of the A’s in A1 ◦ · · · ◦An to have
a valid argument. For
When A and B have been fused ;
Both A and B must be used:
We commit no o,ense against reason (and certainly do not equivocate) in having for
theoretical reasons 2 distinct formal counterparts of and, each subject to its own laws,
in our formal logic. And we may now, adapting for the general case the Gentzen-style
analyses of R+ of [12,26], bunch our premisses as we will, to any desired depth of
nesting, taking for granted only those principles of collection that a logic enforces for
the mode of conjoining in question.
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2. Relevant semantics
Yes, but what do these relevant logics like R and E amount to semantically? This
was for a while a seriously open question. [14,30,33] began to supply some answers.
2.1. A modal paradigm for unary and ♦
As I see it, the semantics of relevant logics generalizes on the plan that Kripke and
others developed for the explication of modal logics. On the plan of [16] we have a
collection K of worlds, related by a 2-place accessibility relation R. We may say that
w sees w′ just in case wRw′. The key Kripke truth-conditions on the 1-place modal
operators ♦ and are then the following:
T♦: ♦A is true at w i, A is true at some w′ that w sees.
T : A is true at w i, A is true at every w′ that w sees.
2.2. Applying the paradigm to relevant → and ◦
What is the plan for a similar explication of the (irreducibly) 2-place operator →?
The simplest (and most Tarskian) course is to introduce a 3-place relation R. We
need some English expression that will do for a ternary R what sees does for a
binary R. So let us survey again those native insights that render irrelevance objec-
tionable. While lots of things in the world are connected, various other things are
unconnected.
The logical signal that A and B are connected is that the implication A→B is true.
Without growing too metaphysical here, we remind readers that there is an old story
on which the premisses of a good argument are necessarily connected to its conclusion.
Modern modal logic sought to take account of the ingredient of necessity in this story.
But the only immediately obvious connection was that o,ered by the material ⊃, with
all its indi,erence to real relations among propositions or in the world.1
We have told another story. When one wishes to state the rule of modus ponens
for →, there are many apparently equivalent ways of stating it. In (pigeon) Formalese,
here are a few:2
(a) 	 A and 	 A→B⊃ 	 B.
(b) 	 A→B and 	 A⊃ 	 B.
(c) 	 A⊃ (	 A→B⊃ 	 B).
(d) 	 A→B⊃ (	 A⊃ 	 B).
1 We reject, as noted above, the notational imperialism on which even the material conditional is so often
symbolized by → these days. In this paper we follow Peano and Whitehead and Russell and (in his heyday)
Quine in using ⊃, leaving → for an honest implication.
2 We use, here and henceforth, ⊃ metalogically to express rules. Like →, the convention on ⊃ is that
implicative particles associate to the right, with logical particles binding more tightly than metalogical ones.
We use ≡ for 2-sided rules. For binary particles the full precedence order is ◦;∧;∨;→;6;¿;⊃;≡.
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People sunk in classical lassitude will not notice much di,erence among (a)–(d).
Recall, though, that traditionally logicians distinguished between the major premiss
A→B of modus ponens and its minor premiss A. That is, modus ponens comes with
a direction, with the major premiss taking us from the minor to the conclusion. I am
accordingly inclined, these days, always to state the rule according to the rubric (d),
dismissing (a) and (c) as lazy alternatives and feeling comfortable with (b) only if
and means what ◦ says in Formalese.
Think initially of the :rst argument of our ternary relation R as a domain of nec-
essary connections—more brieIy, of laws. These do not have to be laws of logic—
biologists, computer scientists, physicists and economists have as much responsibility
for stating the laws of their subjects as logicians have for setting out theirs. Whatever
the source of such laws, we take it to be the job of → statements to express them
syntactically. They are major premisses. The second argument of R takes account of
the initial conditions supplied to laws—brieIy, of input. Nor do we assume in general
that the input belongs to the same world (or theory) as the law. It is a commonplace,
after all, that the job of experiment is to provide data to con:rm (or perhaps to refute)
candidate laws. It is a methodological no–no to confuse the laws with the data. The
third argument of ternary R tallies the result of applying the laws to the input; in a
nutshell, it is the output.
With those ideas in mind, let us give necessary connection a direction by reading
ternary Rwxy as
(1) w directs x to y.
Retaining the worlds metaphor, while dropping as in [31] any constraint that the
worlds in question be logical or even possible, let us say, for any world w and formula
A, that
(2) w is an A-world
if and only if
(3) A is true at w.
We now recall from [32] the key relevant truth-conditions on the 2-place implication
connective → and the fusion connective ◦ discussed in Section 1.3 above. (cf. also,
e.g., [30]).
T→: A→ C is true at w i, w directs all A-worlds to C-worlds:
T◦: A ◦C is true at w i, there exists an A-world that directs a C-world to w:
We introduce some notation henceforth to express truth-conditions like T→ (which
leads as in [23] to nice translations of relevant logics into standard ;rst-order logic). We
express formulas as predicates of worlds, and appeal to standard notational conventions.
We get
T→: [A→ C]w = ∀a∀c(Rwac ⊃ Aa ⊃ Cc);
T◦: [A ◦ C]w = ∃a∃c(Racw ∧ Aa ∧ Cc):
as succinct ways of expressing the above truth-conditions.
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2.3. Extensional connectives interpreted truth-functionally
We will express truth-conditions on logical particles in accordance with the conven-
tions just introduced. Extensional ∧ and ∨ are interpreted as one expects.
T ∧ : [A∧B]w=Aw∧Bw.
T ∨ : [A∨B]w=Aw∨Bw.
Handling negation is a little trickier. On the [31] semantics, the original relevant De-
Morgan negation ∼ is interpreted via a (Polish) technical maneuver, using an auxiliary
unary operation ∗ on worlds. The resulting truth-condition is
T∼: [∼ A]w = ¬[Aw∗]:
Also of interest is making Boolean negation ¬ explicit, satisfying
T¬: [¬A]w = ¬[Aw]:
We postpone for now any further discussion of negation.
3. Demythologized worlds are theories
We have promised not to grow too metaphysical. On the other hand, the modal
paradigm enriched for a relevant framework provides a worlds semantics. It is time to
cash out those worlds in less exorbitant terms—to demythologize them. Happily the
ingredients for this task are at hand. For our completeness proofs were presented using
theories, which will do as the worlds desired.
3.1. Theories de:ned
A theory is a set of statements that hangs together logically. Its time to put a little
meat on those bones. We suppose, in the ;rst place, that we have a logic L, which
furnishes a binary relation of logical consequence. We will use A6B to indicate that
B follows from A, according to logic L. 3 Then the least that we can demand of an
L-theory X is that it respect 6. I.e.,
6E: A6 B ⊃ A ∈ X ⊃ B ∈ X:
On the other hand, we also expect a theory X to respect logical conjunction ∧. I.e.,
∧I: A ∈ X and B ∈ X ⊃ A ∧ B ∈ X:
It has become traditional in work on the algebra and semantics of relevant logics
to characterize X as an L-theory just in case it satis;es 6E and ∧ I for all formulas
A and B.
3 Often A6B is indicated by the theoremhood in L of  A→B. But there are other signals– that A  B
holds in a matching Gentzen consecution calculus. We like the algebraic Iavor of A6B. It saves some
parentheses. But we mean by it here simply that A→B is a theorem (since modus ponens is a main theme).
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3.2. Truth-functional expectations on theories
But not all theories are created equal. There are also the intended meanings of
other logical particles, like ‘or’ and ‘not’. Surely some preference is to be given to
theories that also respect what we intend by these particles. For example, the following
conditions are imposed on theory X by our regulative ideals, as expressed in the truth-
conditions T∧; T∨ and T¬ in Section 2.3.
∧EI: A ∈ X and B ∈ X i, A ∧ B ∈ X:
∨EI: A ∈ X or B ∈ X i, A ∨ B ∈ X:
¬EI: ¬A ∈ X i, A =∈ X:
These conditions fare di@erently in various relevant (and other) logics. ∧EI is more
or less built in—;rst, by the imposition of ∧I on all theories; second, by the standard
character of A∧B6A and A∧B6B. The ∨I half of ∨EI likewise tends to be built in,
since A6A∨B and B6A∨B are also standard. But ∨E is more diNcult to come by. 4
Some intricate technical maneuvers accompany this point in semantical completeness
proofs, often involving the distributive lattice properties of the usual relevant logics.
Finally, we turn to the care and feeding of negation, which is even more diNcult to
come by. In the long run, we prefer our theories to be consistent and complete with
respect to negation. But in practice, we are usually not yet in the long run. On this
point too, delicate results turn.
3.3. Modus ponens products
Let X; Y and Z be any sets of formulas—not further speci;ed for the moment, but
we are aiming at theories. Let us de;ne on such formula sets the following operation ◦:
D◦: X ◦ Y = {B : ∃A(A→ B ∈ X and A ∈ Y )}:
The operation ◦ has had various names. Powers introduced it in [27] as modus ponens
product. Fine [14] called it fusion. But the intuition behind it is one that we have been
driving at throughout this paper, especially since Section 2.2. A formula C belongs
to X ◦Y just in case there is some way of performing modus ponens, taking a major
premiss A→C from X and a minor one A from Y , getting C by an →E move.
And now here is the canonical relation R, on theories X; Y; Z .
DR: RXYZ =df X ◦ Y ⊆ Z:
That’s it. The magical ternary relation arises, on theories, as a way of looking after
modus ponens.
4 After all, we often assert disjunctions without having picked a disjunct. Knowing her, Vandy will go to
the movies tonight, or stay home. But we may not know her well enough to know which.
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But why, you may ask, did we not de;ne the fusion operation ◦ directly on theories,
together with some truth-condition like the following?
T→◦: [A→ B]X i, ∀Y ([A]Y ⊃ [B](X ◦ Y ):
T→◦ was (near enough) the original truth-condition on relevant →, in Urquhart’s
semilattice semantics for R→ worked out in [33] and independently in unpublished
work by Routley. Again independently, Fine [14] proposed T→◦ as a central ingredient
in Fine’s operational-relational semantics for relevant logics. It lurks in the background
of the relational semantics. But I do not yet see a smooth way of moving it to the
foreground.
3.4. The calculus of relevant theories
Let then L be a given (relevant, or even irrelevant) logic. Formulas A are built up
as usual from propositional variables p under ∧;∨;→ and perhaps other connectives
and propositional constants. We use S for the set of all formulas. We presume the
entailment relation A6C on L indicated by 	 A→C in L. We already de;ned L-
theories via 6-closure and ∧-closure above. (Algebraists would call them ;lters, as
Dunn [11] observed.)
We turn now to the Calculus of L-theories CLT= 〈CLT; ◦;⊆〉, where CLT is the set
of all L-theories, 5 ◦ is the binary modus ponens product (or fusion) operation de;ned
on sets of formulas by D ◦ above and ⊆ is the subset (here, subtheory) relation. It is
normally a simple exercise, safely left to readers, to show that CLT is indeed closed
under ◦.
4. Combinatory logic CL
In Section 2.2 we laid down truth-conditions for the properly relevant connectives →
and ◦. But we have not yet said anything about the semantical postulates to be imposed
on the 3-place relation that builds in the direction enjoined by modus ponens. Such
postulates, applied to the 2-place relation that served as our paradigm in Section 2.1,
enabled Kripke [16] and others to characterize various modal logics and to distinguish
them from each other. What will serve as a guide to do the same for relevant logics?
Our answer is “Combinatory Logic” (henceforth, CL) in the sense of Curry. We give
a quick recapitulation of central ideas. The atoms of CL consist of countably many
variables (for which we use ‘x’, etc.) and some primitive constants (among them
some selection among I; S; K; B; B′; W; C, and perhaps others). The terms (or, following
[9], the obs) are built up from atoms and constants using a single binary operation
symbol, for which we use ‘◦’, interpreted as the application of a 1-place function to
an argument. We use ‘M ’, ‘N ’, etc. for arbitrary obs.
The intuitive universe of CL consists of 1-place functions. But n-place functions may
be simulated (or curried, though the original idea seems to have been SchVon;nkel’s) by
5 One may (or may not) wish to count the null set , and the set S of all formulas as L-theories.
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iterated application of 1-place functions. Parentheses are used for grouping subterms,
subject to the conventions of (a) dropping ‘◦’ for simple juxtaposition and (b) associ-
ating to the left, for ease in reading terms. We deal here only with pure combinatory
logic, building up its theory of (weak) equality.
We begin with axioms for 1-step contraction, for which we use ‘¿1’. Each constant
is governed by an accompanying axiom (scheme) for ¿1. Among the famous ones are
I: IX ¿1 X;
K: KXY ¿1 X;
K∗: K∗XY ¿1 Y;
S: SXYZ ¿1 XZ(YZ);
B: BXYZ ¿1 X (YZ);
B′: B′XYZ ¿1 Y (XZ);
W: WXY ¿1 XYY;
C: CXYZ ¿1 XZY;
C∗: C∗XY ¿1 YX;
W ∗: W ∗X ¿1 XX:
That is enough for now. We will use ¿ for the reIexive, transitive closure of ¿1,
imposing the additional monotonic principles
.: X ¿ Y ⊃ ZX ¿ ZY;
/: X ¿ Y ⊃ XZ ¿ YZ:
Suppose that X¿Y in CL. We then say that X contracts (or reduces) to Y , and that
Y expands to X . Similarly we may say that Y is a contraction of X , and that X is
an expansion of Y .
The aim of CL is to develop a theory of the equality of functions. So we introduce
a further predicate ‘=’, which is the symmetric and transitive closure of ¿. Central
to the epitheory of CL is however the following theorem, stated in [9] as
Church–Rosser theorem. Suppose X =Y . Then there is a Z such that X¿Z and
Y¿Z .
This theorem establishes the consistency of CL. So there is a central sense in which
the CL theory of equality is grounded and secured in its theory of reduction.
Inspired by Powers [27], I devised around 1970 the Fools Model (FMO) of Com-
binatory Logic. (cf. [22].) Here, all the combinators are simply taken as the closure
under substitution of their “Curry types”—i.e., sets of pure → formulas. Application
is simulated by the fusion operation ◦ de;ned in Section 3.3 by D◦, on arbitrary sets
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of → formulas. We write, temporarily, ‘∀[A]’ to indicate the set of all substitution
instances of a formula scheme A. Among the de;nitions were these of some famous
combinators.
4.1. Some FMO “combinators”
I = ∀[p→ p];
C = ∀[(p→ q→ r)→ q→ p→ r];
B = ∀[(q→ r)→ (p→ q)→ p→ r];
C∗ = ∀[p→ (p→ q)→ q];
B′ = ∀[(p→ q)→ (q→ r)→ p→ r];
K = ∀[p→ q→ p];
K∗ = ∀[p→ q→ q];
W = ∀[(p→ p→ q)→ p→ q];
S = ∀[(p→ q→ r)→ (p→ q)→ p→ r];
4.2. FMO sometimes models combinatory equality
These are among the identities that FMO veri;es, where X; Y; Z are any sets of →
formulas: 6
IX = X;
CXYZ = XZY;
BXYZ = X (YZ);
C∗XY = YX;
B′XYZ = Y (XZ):
These correspond, in the vocabulary of Combinatory Logic, to 1-step reductions. We
saw above that (weak) combinatory equality is the reIexive, transitive, symmetric and
monotonic closure of 1-step reduction. We de;ne BCI-combinators inductively by
(1) B; C, and I are BCI-combinators,
(2) If M and N are BCI-combinators, so is M ◦N .
Still adapting Curry, let us extend this de;nition by calling a term M a BCI-ob by
adding
(3) If M is a variable or a BCI-combinator then M is a BCI-ob,
(4) If M and N are BCI-obs, so is M ◦N .
6 Apply now the usual conventions of CL, dropping ◦ for juxtaposition and associating to the left.
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We have then
BCI equality fact. Let the BCI obs M and N be demonstrably weakly equal in CL.
Then also v(M)= v(N ) in FMO, where v is any assignment of sets of →-formulas
to variables which respects ◦ and the ;xed interpretation of the BCI-combinators. The
BCI-fact will hold moreover for any combinator de:nable from B; C; I (e.g., as B′ is
de;nable as CB).
4.3. FMO always models combinatory reduction
Some of the other laws, sadly, only hold in the reduction direction. E.g., we have
KXY ⊆ X;
K∗XY ⊆ Y;
WXY ⊆ XYY;
SXYZ ⊆ XZ(YZ):
Particularly disturbing is the K case, which almost holds as an equality. But KX,=,,
where , is the empty set of formulas. Could we not rule out ,? Alas no, since WI =,,
famously. 7 (Still, there is an extension of the BCI-fact above to a corresponding BCK-
fact, for non-empty BCK obs.) But it is nonetheless true that if any combinatory ob
M (weakly) reduces to a term N , then as in the examples above the corresponding
subset relation will surely hold in FMO. 8
Speci;cally, a combinatory ob is de;ned inductively as follows:
(4) If M is a variable then M is a combinatory ob,
(5) If M is S; K; B; C; I;W; B′; C∗ or K∗ then M is a combinatory ob,
(6) If M and N are combinatory obs, then so is M ◦N .
Combinatory reduction fact. Let M and N be combinatory obs, and let M¿N .
Then also v(M)⊆ v(N ) in FMO, where v is any assignment of sets of →-formulas to
variables which respects ◦ and the ;xed interpretation above of the combinators.
The choice of primitive combinators under (5) is more or less up to us. S and K
will do. We give a long list, since di,erent choices of primitive combinators yield
di,erent logics.
5. The key to the universe
The above plot thickens in the presence of logical particles besides →. And (of all
things) our modeling of CL improves.
7 That is, on the Curry and Feys [9] analysis, WI “has no type”. We look further at WI below.
8 In virtue, if you please, of the Subject Reduction Theorem of Curry and Feys [9].
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5.1. Modeling I
A logical axiom scheme almost always 9 present is
Ax I: 	 A→ A
Let now I denote the closure of all instances of AxI under 6E; ∧ I , where 6 is the
entailment of the minimal positive relevant logic B+ of Routley and Meyer [30]. 10
Amazingly, I so de;ned coincides with the set of theorems of B+. Note also, CL and
 fans, that I so de;ned has exactly the right properties to mimic the combinator I .
For
I fact. Let X be any B+-theory. Then I ◦X =X .
Proof. The l. to r: inclusion holds because I is B+, and B+-theories are closed under
B+-entailment. The r. to l. inclusion holds on the reasoning that yields X ⊆ I ◦X in
Section 4.2.
5.2. Modeling other combinators
Even readers who know relevant and other substructural logics well may be insu7-
ciently impressed with the I fact. After all, we saw in the BCI equality fact in Section
4.2 that even the Fools model FMO captures I perfectly. This is more than we can
say for cancellators like K and K∗, and a lot more than we can say about combinators
with a duplicating e,ect like W and S.
Let us begin with the duplicators. The most depressing fact in the Fools model
FMO is that the combinator WI (which we henceforth follow Curry and Feys [9] in
abbreviating W ∗) ought to produce
W ∗ ◦ X = X ◦ X;
a pure duplication, but instead W ∗=, and then W ∗ ◦X is the null set ,. But there
is a remedy for this depression. It arises because, in FMO,
W ∗ = W ◦ I = ∀[(p→ (p→ q))→ (p→ q)] ◦ ∀[r → r]
and there is no way to ;nd a common substitution instance A→ (A→B) of an an-
tecedent of W and C→C of I . In the parlance of the automated reasoners, we cannot
unify p→ (p→ q) and r→ r. For the cost of so doing would be to identify a formula
A→B with its own proper subformula A. That’s why W ∗=, in the Fools model.
Our preoccupation with theories rides now to the rescue. In FMO, the “combinators”
were sets of → formulas, closed under substitution. Suppose instead that we pursue
further the policy in Section 5.1 by making all the combinators into theories, requiring
9 Not quite always. Martin [19] gives a nice solution to Belnap’s P-W problem, on which A→A is an
anti-theorem of S→ none of whose instances are provable from AxB; AxB′ and →E.
10 We take B+ here as formulated in the →;∧;∨ vocabulary, with optional extras to taste.
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also closure under both ∧I and an appropriate relevant entailment relation 6. This will
do wonders for W ∗. For since (A→B)6A→B in B+, we have in B+, on a couple
of steps of antecedent replacement,
(1) (A→ B) ∧ A6 (A→ B) ∧ A→ B:
For ease in reading the formula, set
(2) 2 = (A→ B) ∧ A:
We observe on simple FMO principles,
(3) (2→ (2→ B))→ (2→ B) ∈ W
while the coincidence between B+ entailment and membership in the combinator I
yields by (1)
(4) 2→ (2→ B) ∈ I
whence by (3) and (4) and modus ponens
(5) 2→ B ∈ W ◦ I:
I.e., applying (2) to (5),
(6) (A→ B) ∧ A→ B ∈ W ∗:
We must now pause for some annoying technicalities. The reasoning just gone through
means that we have found a “type” for the combinator W ∗ (which was more than
Curry and Feys [9] could do). Ronchi della Rocca and Venneri [29] shows that we
have done better. We have found a principal type for W ∗, which we set down as
W∗ = ∀[(p→ q) ∧ p→ q};
where the schematic notation ∀[: : :} now indicates that the displayed formula is closed
under all of uniform substitution, ∧I and 6E, where 6 is supplied by the minimal
relevant logic. Having handled I already as ∀[p→p}, we expand the schemes above
by likewise laying it down that
C = ∀[(p→ q→ r)→ q→ p→ r};
B = ∀[(q→ r)→ (p→ q)→ p→ r}
and similarly for “combinators” C∗;B′, W;S, etc.
Before tackling the cancellators K and K∗, we pause for the ;rst of our annoying
technicalities. Back in FMO we observed that the reduction direction of modeling CL
was the proverbial piece of cake. The expansion direction, though it was perfect on
BCI-obs, just failed on the cancellators and duplicators. As it now turns out, it is
expansion which is the piece of cake, while reduction is no longer so pleasant. We
illustrate with W∗.
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Show W∗ ◦X =X ◦X , where X is a theory:
Expansion: Suppose B∈X ◦X . For some A; A→B∈X and A∈X , by D◦. But
then, by ∧I; (A→B)∧A∈X . Because (A→B)∧A→B∈W∗, we have by D◦ that
B∈W∗ ◦X .
Contraction: Suppose B∈W∗ ◦X . Then there is some C→B∈W∗ such that C ∈X .
How in the world does this ensure that B is in X ◦X ?
There will be an answer (as the song assures us). But it is an answer sensitive
to vocabulary, enjoined by Dezani’s beautiful Bubbling lemma (2.4(ii) of Barendregt
et al. [4]). Meanwhile we look after the cancellators. We begin with the theories,
K = ∀[p→ (q→ p)};
K∗ = ∀[p→ (q→ q)}:
Our ;rst aim is to show, for theories X and Y , that K ◦X ◦Y =X . We know from
our musings about FMO that we are in trouble if Y =,. Coppo and his colleagues
found a neat way out of this trouble. (cf. [4]). We will think of it as follows. The
condition ∧I on theories assures that, where X is any non-empty set of formulas each
of which belongs to the theory Y , so also must the conjunction ∧X of these formulas
belong to Y (e.g., if {A; B; C}⊆Y then A∧B∧C ∈Y ). Let us extend this thinking to
the empty set ,. Lattice-theoretically, the meet (i.e., conjunction) of the empty subset
of elements of a lattice L is conveniently computed as the Top element of L, which
we call T ([4] called it !, cf. [10].)
Intuitively, T will express the proposition that is true at every world. (T is a Church
constant. Think of it with [3] as the trivially true disjunction ∃pp of all propositions,
to be contrasted with the I-surrogate Ackermann constant t, the more interestingly true
conjunction ∀p(p→p)). It is consistent with other minimal relevant ideas to lay down
both A6T and T6A→T, which as in [4] we henceforth assume.
A T-theory is now constrained to contain T, and to be closed as just suggested.
Now we can make short work of (half of) K.
K-expansion: Show X ⊆K ◦X ◦Y , where X and Y are T-theories. Suppose A∈X .
Anyway, A→ (T→A)∈K, whence T→A∈K ◦X . But Y is a T-theory, whence
A∈K ◦X ◦Y . Done!
5.3. The fools model perfected in B∧T -theories
In this section we zero in on a fragment of the minimal relevant logic, which will
exactly model weak equality in Combinatory Logic. B∧ (pronounced BAND) will
be the fragment of B+ in just → and ∧, given by the following axiom and rule
schemes:
Ax I: A6 A
Ax ∧ E: A ∧ B6 A and A ∧ B6 B
Ax→∧ I: (A→ B) ∧ (A→ C)6 A→ B ∧ C
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Ru→E: A6 C ⊃	 A ⊃	 C
Ru∧I: 	 A and 	 B ⊃	 A ∧ B
RuB B6 C ⊃ A→ B6 A→ C
RuB′: A6 B ⊃ B→ C 6 A→ C
We have seen that, to get past our diNculties with the cancellators, it is advisable to
throw T into the vocabulary, extending B∧ to the richer system B∧T (pronounced
BAT). Add to the above
AxTI: A6 T
AxTE: T6 A→ T
Note that AxTE becomes redundant if we have a fusion connective. Apply (1) in
Section 1.3 to T ◦A6T.
We now present the Fools Model Updated (henceforth FMU) in the T-theories of
B∧T. As the domain of FMU we take the set of all T-theories. Readers may enjoy
themselves showing that FMU is closed under the fusion of T-theories de;ned by D◦.
Expansion is the promised cake.
Combinatory expansion fact for FMU. Let M and N be combinatory obs such that
M weakly reduces to N. Then also v(M)⊇ v(N ) in FMU, where v is any assignment
of T-theories to variables which respects ◦ and the :xed interpretation above of the
combinators.
Proof. Assign the T-theory K above to the combinator K , and similarly for other com-
binators. Proceed as in the W∗ and K expansion arguments to show that if XY1 : : : Yn=Z
results from 1-step reduction on a combinator X , then X ◦ v(Y1) ◦ · · · ◦ v(Yn)⊇ v(Z).
In general all that will be required for this veri;cation is the “principal type” of the
combinator in question, as above. The rest of the proof goes through inductively on
the observation that ⊇ is reIexive and transitive, while satisfying the monotonicity
conditions, given X ⊇Y , that Z ◦X ⊇Z ◦Y and X ◦Z ⊇Y ◦Z .
The party is over, as we saw above, when it comes to modeling contractions. So
we had better pause for the
Bubbling lemma (Barendregt et al. [4]). Suppose (A1→C1)∧ · · · ∧ (An→Cn)6A→C
in B∧, which we write as ∧i∈I (Ai→Ci)6A→C. Then there is some non-empty :nite
subset J ⊆ I such that A6 ∧j∈J Aj and
∧
j∈J Cj6C in B∧.
We will now apply the Bubbling Lemma (henceforth, BL) to ;nish sketching a proof
that the contraction half of our argument ad W∗ ◦X =X ◦X is ok in FMU. Assuming
B∈W∗ ◦X , we reached in Section 5.2 above the conclusion that there is a C→B
in W∗ such that C ∈X . To be shown is that B∈X ◦X . We must now look a little
more carefully at the members of W∗. Analysis indicates that D∈W∗ i, there is some
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conjunction of formulas of the form (E→F)∧E→F which entails D in B∧T. D is
in this case a particular formula C→B. Omitting the feeding and care of T, we get
by BL, for some ;nite set J of indices, C6
∧
j∈J ((Ej→Fj)∧Ej) while
∧
j∈J Fj6B.
Because C ∈X , we have by closure of X under 6 that each of the Ej→Fj is in X ,
while so also is each of the Ej in X . So, for all j∈ J we have Fj in X ◦X , by D◦.
By ∧ I the conjunction of these Fj is in the theory X ◦X . But we just saw that this
conjunction entails B. So B is in X ◦X , as desired.
So it goes, as the reader may verify by consulting [4,10]. The result is
Combinatory contraction fact for FMU. Let M and N be combinatory obs such that
M (weakly) reduces to N. Then also v(M)⊆ v(N ) in FMU, where v is any assignment
of T-theories to variables which respects ◦ and the :xed interpretation above of the
combinators.
Proof. The hard part in each case is verifying the 1-step reduction principles for par-
ticular combinators. Leaving that to readers (which they may look up if necessary, or
apply BL case by case for extra fun), the remaining inductive steps are straightforward
as before. Done!
We can now recapitulate the promised
Key2U theorem. FMU models CL. Suppose that M =N in CL. Always v(M)= v(N )
in FMU.
Proof. By the contraction and expansion facts for FMU. Done!
6. Semantical steps forward
We came in the last section to a rewarding realization—namely, that the semantics
of relevant logics supplies, in its partnership with CL and , the veritable key to the
universe. Before being too carried away, let us pause to see what we have unlocked.
We were concerned a while ago to relate CL to semantical postulate sets for particular
relevant logics. It all had something to do with bunches, you may recall.
6.1. Combinators and bunches
We have contrasted an extensional bunching, under ∧, with a relevant one, under
◦. But hitherto ◦ has only made an occasional appearance in this paper, and that
principally not as a logical particle but as the metalogical operator de;ned by D◦ in
Section 3.3 on whole theories. Still, the metalogical operator can be parent to a logical
one, since we set down in Section 2.2 a truth-condition To for evaluating formulas
A ◦B at worlds (or theories) w.
On the other hand, we have ;rm intuitions about how ∧ should behave. We expect
∧ to be associative, commutative and idempotent. It does not disappoint. What should
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we expect of ◦? That depends. In a strong relevant logic like R, fusion ◦ is indeed
associative and commutative; it even delivers semi-idempotence, since A6A ◦A in R.
(The extension RM of R also provides the converse—at the cost, alas, of fallacies of
relevance.) But weaker logics like E and T chop away at those smooth properties of
◦, until none of them are left in the minimal system B of Routley et al. [32].
I say that this is as it should be. For a choice among logics is at the same time a
choice among combinators. To like the pre:xing axiom (B→C)→ (A→B)→A→C
is, in the presence of an explicit fusion ◦, to aNrm also one direction of the associa-
tivity of ◦. Speci;cally it is to aNrm that (D ◦E) ◦F logically entails D ◦ (E ◦F), in
conformity to the 1-step reduction postulate for the matching combinator B in Section 4.
This behavior is ubiquitous. We can illustrate it at the level of B∧, formulated
explicitly in Section 5.3. We extend B∧ to a system B[→;∧; ◦ ], which makes fusion
explicit and adds to the formulation above the 2-sided residuation rule expected from
our discussion in Section 1.3:
Ru→◦: A ◦ B6 C ≡ A6 B→ C:
We shall now revert to using simple juxtaposition for fusion ◦, associating iterated
fusions to the left. Iterated →’s continue to associate to the right. It is straightforward
to show that the following are theorems and derivable rules.
B1. (A→B)A6B,
B2. A6B→AB,
B3. A6B⊃AC6BC,
B4. A6B⊃CA6CB.
We now pin down the syntactic correlate of the Key to the Universe in the table
below.
CL ob Fusion fact Implication fact
W ∗ A6AA (A→B)∧A6B
C∗ AB6BA A6(A→B)→B
C ABC6ACB A→ (B→C)6B→ (A→C)
W AB6ABB A→ (A→B)6A→B
B ABC6A(BC) B→C6(A→B)→ (A→C)
B′ ABC6B(AC) A→B6(B→C)→ (A→C)
S ABC6AC(BC) A→ (B→C)6(A→B)→ (A→C)
WB AB6A(AB) (B→C)∧ (A→B)6A→C
K AB6A A6B→A
K∗ AB6B A6B→B
Combinator Correspondence Theorem (CCT). Let L be any logic extending B[→;
∧; ◦ ]. Then any of the fusion facts is a theorem scheme of L i@ the corresponding
implication fact is a theorem scheme.
Proof. We do a couple of cases, leaving the rest as exercises to the reader.
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Ad K , observe simply that AB6A i, A6B→A in L, applying Ru→◦ in each
direction.
Ad S. (⇒)
1. (A→B→C) ◦ (A→B) ◦A S fusion fact,
6((A→ (B→C)) ◦A) ◦ ((A→B) ◦A)
2. ((A→ (B→C)) ◦A)6B→C B1,
3. ((A→B) ◦A)6B B1 again,
4. ((A→ (B→C)) ◦A) ◦ ((A→B) ◦A)6(B→C) ◦B 2; 3; B3; B4,
5. (B→C) ◦B6C B1,
5. (A→B→C) ◦ (A→B) ◦A6(B→C) ◦B6C 1; 4; 5;6Transitivity,
6. A→ (B→C)6(A→B)→ (A→C) 5;Ru→◦ (twice).
(⇐)
Set 2=AC(BC)
1. C→ (BC→ 2)6(C→BC)→ (C→ 2) S Implication fact,
2. B6C→BC B2,
3. C→ (BC→ 2)6B→ (C→ 2) 1, 2, Monotonicity,
4. AC(BC)62 Df2;6ReIexivity,
5. A6C→ (BC→ 2) 4;Ru→◦ (twice),
6. A6B→ (C→ 2) 5; 3;6Transitivity,
7. ABC6AC(BC) 6;Ru→◦ (twice); Df2.
6.2. Implication on its head
Recall the truth-condition T→ in the relational semantics
T→: [A→ C]w = ∀a∀c(Rwac ⊃ Aa ⊃ Cc):
What happens if we replace it with this truth-condition T→r?
T→r: [A→ rC]w = ∀a∀c(Rawc ⊃ Aa ⊃ Cc):
The answer is, “It depends on the logic.” In our hitherto paradigmatic logic R, nothing
happens. (Neither does anything happen in the linear logic LL of Girard [15].) Put
otherwise, → and →r are the same implication connective in R. But R is quite a strong
relevant logic. But we have been lately thinking about minimal logics like B, from
which the stronger logics arise by imposing special assumptions. And the equivalence
of Rwac and Rawc, which justi;es on the [31] semantics the identi;cation of → and
→r for R, certainly looks like a special assumption.
This is true, as we noted in [24]. 11 If desired, we may add →r conservatively to
minimal relevant vocabulary, together with the rule,
Ru→r◦: A ◦ B6 C ≡ B6 A→ rC
11 Dunn [13], though generous in acknowledging indebtedness to [24], misses this point. In fairness, it was
Lambek who introduced →r to substructural logics. cf. [17].
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Having → r in the vocabulary brings back at even the minimal B+ level some char-
acteristic theorems of R and LL, by mixing and matching the →’s. For example,
consider
C∗rl: A6 (A→r B)→ B;
C∗lr: A6 (A→B)→r B:
These variants of the C∗ theorem of LL and of R are already provable at the minimal
level.
What is the use of this twisted implication →r? To begin with, we might re-
verse all the intuitions to which we have appealed so far, thinking of →r as the
native implication and coming to prefer (c) in Section 2.2 as a preferential way of
stating modus ponens. Thinking of implication (as we have) as resting on real re-
lations between input and output, there is a neat and appealing symmetry in T→r—
input a on the left, output c on the right and (implicative) relation w in the
middle.
Speaking personally (and yearning as my faithful readers know to be traditional in
all things), I will leave my own intuitions as they are, sticking with Aristotle on the
point that major premisses come :rst, as in Section 2.2(d). I also resist arrows pointing
every which way, not wishing to confuse myself (and possibly others) by introducing
← as a counterpart to → and setting it down that one of them shall be left and the
other right. In my vocabulary, → is here a left residual, satisfying Ru→◦. And what
I call the right residual →r is what satis;es Ru→r◦.
That being settled, what should we make of →r? It is good, I think, to agree with
Restall that the connectives ◦;→ and →r form a family, with ◦ as the parent [28,
p. 30]. And since our logics, when we sought to plumb their depths, forced ◦ upon us
(e. g., in [24]) to account algebraically and semantically for →, it would seem that in
the general case they have no less forced →r upon us. We shall not, however, explore
this line any further here. See [13,28].
6.3. The classical minimal relevant logic CB
The minimal logic B of Routley and Meyer [32] is the (conservative) result of
adding a DeMorgan negation ∼ to B+, satisfying the truth-condition T∼ in Section
2.3. More interesting, for present purposes, is the (still conservative) result of adding
the fully Boolean negation ¬, governed by T¬ in Section 2.3. The resulting system
is CB (introduced as CB+ in [21]). We formulate CB here with ◦;→;∧;¬ primitive,
subject to the following de;nitions.
D∨: A ∨ B=df ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B);
D⊃: A ⊃ B=df ¬(A ∧ ¬B);
D≡: A ≡ B=df (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A);
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D↔: A↔ B=df (A→ B) ∧ (B→ A);
DF: F=df p ∧ ¬p; where p is the ;rst propositional variable;
DT: T=df ¬F:
We state quickly the semantics for CB. A CB model structure (CBms) is a triple
K= 〈0; K; R〉, where K is a set (of worlds, if you like), 0∈K (the real world) and R
is a ternary relation on K . There is only 1 postulate, for all a; b∈K :
p0: R0ab i, a = b:
Setting 2= {1; 0}=(true; false; if you like), a possible interpretation I of the lan-
guage L in K is any function I :L × K→ 2. Using again [A]a for I(A; a)= 1, etc., I
is moreover an interpretation of L in K if it satis;es the appropriate truth-conditions
T¬; T∧; T→; T◦ above. Note that the interpretation I will automatically satisfy ap-
propriate truth-conditions T∨; T⊃, etc., and that the (Boolean) conditions on truth-
functions assure I(T)= 1 and I(F)= false always. A formula A is veri:ed on the
interpretation I i, I(A; 0)=1; it is valid in K i, it is veri;ed on all interpretations
therein; ;nally, A is CB-valid i, A is valid in every CBms K.
We may, as a ;rst approximation, simply identify the logic CB with the set of
CB-valid formulas. We note the following easy theorem:
Finite model theorem. Every non-theorem of CB is invalid in some ;nite model.
Proof. By adaptation of Routley’s :ltration method [32], as by Brady in [5, 277pp.].
Speci;cally, suppose B a non-theorem of CB. Then there is a CBms K= 〈0; K; R〉 and
an interpretation I in K such that not [B]0. If K is ;nite, we are through. So suppose
K in;nite. Let Sub(B)= {A: A is a subformula of B}. Sub(B), at least, is ;nite. We
de;ne an equivalence relation Q on K by setting, for all x; y∈K; xQy i,, for all
A∈Sub(B), I(A; x)= I(A; y). Consider now the result K=Q of collapsing K modulo
Q. At least K=Q is ;nite (since the ;nitely many subformulas of B can separate at
most ;nitely many worlds). We refer to K=Q henceforth simply as K ′, and to the
equivalence classes that are its members as a′, etc. K ′ will be moreover a CBms as
soon as we provide it with a 0′ and de;ne a ternary relation R′ on it. For the second
of these tasks, let R′a′b′c′ hold i, there exist a in a′; b in b′ and c in c′ such that
Rabc. Then, ignoring 0=Q (except as one of the a′), we add a new 0′ subject to the
condition p0 on K ′; R′. Finally, use I to de;ne an interpretation I ′ in K′= 〈0′; K ′; R′〉
by setting, for each propositional variable p in Sub(B), (i) I ′(p; 0′)= I(p; 0) and (ii)
I ′(p; a′)= I(p; a) for a in a′ (recalling that the a agree on I on all subformulas of
B). Extend I ′ uniquely to all relevant formulas by imposing T¬; T∧; T→; T◦. We wish
now to show that, for all A in Sub(B) both (1) I ′(A; 0′)= I(A; 0) and (2) for all a
in K , I ′(A; a′)= I(A; a). (1) and (2) hold by stipulations (i) and (ii) when A is a
variable. We turn to the inductive case. The conclusion is immediate on IH when
A is of the form ¬C or C ∧D. Suppose that A is C→D. Given p0, (1) reduces
to ∀x′([C]x′⊃ [D]x′) i, ∀x([C]x⊃ [D]x), which clearly holds on IH. (2) becomes
∀y′∀z′(R′a′y′z′⊃ [C]y′ ⊃ [D]z′) i, ∀y∀z(Rayz⊃ [C]y⊃ [D]z). Here it is important
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that C and D both are subformulas of the subformula A of B, and are accordingly
covered by the IH. Suppose ;rst that A is false on I at a. Then by T→ there are
c and d such that Racd and [C]c but not [D]d. By de;nition of R′ we have also
R′a′c′d′. Combining this with the IH we get also [C]c′ but not [D]d′, refuting A at
a′ on I ′ by T→. Suppose conversely that A is false on I ′ at a′. Then by T→ there
are c′; d′ such that R′a′c′d′ and [C]c′ but not [D]d′. By de;nition of R′ there are a
in a′; c in c′ and d in d′ such that Racd, while [C]c but not [D]d on IH. So A is
refuted also at a on our original interpretation I in K . This completes the veri;cation
of (2) and ends the inductive argument re C→D. Finally consider the case where
A is C ◦D. (1) now reduces by T◦ to the claim that ∃y′∃z′(R′y′z′0′ ∧ [C]y′ ∧ [D]z′)
i, ∃y∃z(Ryz0∧ [C]y∧ [D]z). It is time to appeal to the special properties of 0 and
of 0′, imposed by the ;at p0. The only possibility, given p0, to satisfy Ryz0 occurs
if y= z=0, and similarly for R′y′z′0′. So the claim that must be veri;ed for (1) in
this case is [C]0′ ∧ [D]0′ i, [C]0∧ [D]0, and this is true on IH. (Caution: this gets
trickier in the case of the CR∗ of Meyer et al. [25], since Ryz0 may be satis;ed
non-trivially in that case. But ;ltrations do not work anyway for that undecidable
system!) Finally we must verify (2) in the C ◦D case, which boils down by T◦ to
∃y′∃z′(R′y′z′a′ ∧ [C]y′ ∧ [D]z′) i, ∃y∃z(Ryza∧ [C]y∧ [D]z). Argue as in the → case,
assuming this time one side true on the associated interpretation and using the IH to
show that the other side also must be true. In conclusion we have shown that the bad
guy B takes the same value (namely false) at 0′ in the chopped down ;nite CBms on
I ′ that it took in the in;nite CBms on I . End of proof!
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